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Abstract 
This study presents a detailed investigation of public scepticism about 
anthropogenic climate change in Britain using the trend, attribution, and impact 
scepticism framework of Rahmstorf (2004). The study found that climate scepticism 
is currently not widespread in Britain. Although uncertainty and scepticism about the 
potential impacts of climate change were fairly common, both trend and attribution 
scepticism were far less prevalent. It further showed that the different types of 
scepticism are strongly interrelated. Although this may suggest that the general 
public does not clearly distinguish between the different aspects of the climate 
debate, there is a clear gradation in prevalence along the Rahmstorf typology. 
Climate scepticism appeared particularly common among older individuals from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds who are politically conservative and hold 
traditional values; while less common among younger individuals from higher socio-
economic backgrounds who hold self-transcendence and environmental values. The 
finding that climate scepticism is rooted in people’s core values and worldviews may 
imply coherent and encompassing sceptical outlook on climate change. However, 
the results that attitudinal certainty is mainly concentrated in non-sceptical groups 
suggest that climate sceptical views are not held very firmly. The implications of the 
findings for climate change communication and engagement are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Climate change is arguably one of the greatest challenges the world is facing 
in the 21st century. The threats posed by climate change have set the international 
community the almost impossible dilemma of severely limiting the emissions of 
greenhouse gases or to face the considerable risks associated with global 
temperature rises. Many have argued that the targets in greenhouse gas reductions 
as agreed under the Kyoto protocol are unlikely to be sufficient to avoid dangerous 
climate change. The UK Government has therefore set itself the ambitious longer-
term domestic target of 80% reduction in all greenhouse gases by 2050 in the legally 
binding Climate Change Act (Defra, 2008). Meeting this target will require major 
shifts towards low-carbon energy production as well as significant reductions in the 
demand for energy. 
Public perceptions and attitudes are critically important to both the supply and 
the demand side of the transition to a low-carbon economy. On the supply side, 
public acceptance of new and innovative energy facilities such as power stations and 
new grid infrastructure will play a key role. We know from a range of past case-
studies that community opposition can lead to delays or even cancellation of plans 
and construction (Boholm & Löfstedt, 2004; Toke, 2005). In particular in the UK there 
has been frequent environmental controversy and at times strong public opposition 
across a number of renewable energy developments, including onshore and offshore 
wind energy (Devine-Wright, 2005), biomass energy (Upreti, 2004), and tidal power 
(SDC, 2008). Other low-carbon infrastructure developments such as carbon capture 
and storage (Shackley et al., 2005) and the proposed renewal of UK nuclear power 
sector (Pidgeon et al., 2008) are also likely to bring public controversy. Indeed, the 
UK government sees the reluctance of the public to accept new energy 
developments in their community as one of the main challenges to the transition to a 
low carbon economy (DTI, 2003). On the demand side, perceptions of the need to 
take mitigating action against climate change, and of the ability to act on this, can be 
key precursors to personal behaviour change and compliance with wider policies 
aimed to motivate such changes (Spence & Pidgeon, 2009; American Psychological 
Association, 2010). 
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Previous research has shown that awareness and self-reported knowledge of 
climate change has been rising steadily over the last two decades (Defra, 2002; 
Defra, 2007; Upham et al., 2009), with awareness of the terms ‘climate change’ and 
‘global warming’ being near universal in the UK since the early 2000s (Lorenzoni et 
al., 2006; Whitmarsh, 2009; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). A survey conducted in 2005 
found that an overwhelming majority of the British public thought that the world’s 
climate is changing and that they consider this as one of the most pressing 
environmental threats (Poortinga et al., 2006). However, recent research suggests 
that scepticism and uncertainty about climate change has increased in both Europe 
and the US in the last couple of years (Eurobarometer, 2009; Department for 
Transport, 2010; Leiserowitz et al., 2010a); a development that may have been 
bolstered by the controversies surrounding leaked emails from scientists working at 
the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia and errors made in glacial 
melting forecasts in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC; Berkhout, 2010), as well as perhaps the unusually harsh 
European winter of 2009-2010 (cf. Joireman et al, 2010). It is important to have a 
detailed understanding of the extent and the reasons why people hold climate 
sceptical views, as public scepticism and uncertainty about the existence of 
anthropogenic climate change may become a major barrier to the development of a 
more sustainable society. It will be a difficult task to convince the public to make 
sacrifices in terms of their lifestyle and to support renewable energy developments in 
their community if they do not believe the climate is changing or will have a real 
impact on their lives.  
1.2. Public Scepticism and Uncertainty about Climate Change 
When exploring sceptical beliefs among the general public, it has to be noted 
that scepticism is an imprecise term that has multiple meanings given the complex 
multi-faceted nature of the climate debate. Rahmstorf (2004) makes a useful 
distinction between trend sceptics, who deny there is such a thing as an upward 
trend in global temperatures, attribution sceptics, who accept that the world’s climate 
may be changing but do not think that it is caused by human activity, and impact 
sceptics, who agree that the world’s climate is changing as a result of human activity 
but do not think it will lead to substantial detrimental impacts. Furthermore, differing 
terms, such as scepticism, cynicism, denialism, uncertainty and ambivalence, which 
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are all key characteristics of public responses to the current climate change debate, 
are often used interchangeably. For example, Dunlap and McCright (2010) use the 
term ‘denial’ in the same fashion as Rahmstorf uses ‘scepticism’ to describe disbelief 
in the existence, anthropogenic nature, or seriousness of climate change. Within the 
literature a lively debate has emerged as to whether ‘unconvinced camps’ should be 
called ‘climate deniers’, ‘sceptics’, or ‘contrarians’ (O’Neill & Boykoff, 2010; Anderegg 
et al., 2010a;b), all of which seem to refer to a “small coterie of individuals” who are 
“waiting to pounce on any scientific uncertainty” (Nature editorial, 2010), whose 
views and expertise are incongruent with mainstream climate science consensus 
(Anderegg & Harold, 2009), or who vocally challenge what they see as a false 
consensus of mainstream climate science through critical attacks on climate science 
and eminent climate scientists (McCright, 2007).  
In terms of public scepticism about climate change, it is important to 
distinguish between different attitudinal terms such as scepticism, uncertainty, and 
ambivalence. Whereas the concept of scepticism refers to strongly held disbeliefs in 
or a rejection of the tenets of mainstream climate science, uncertainty refers to a 
lower subjective sense of conviction or validity as to whether climate change ‘really’ 
exists, is caused by human activity, and/or will have major impacts (cf. Petty & 
Krosnick, 1995). People who express attitudinal uncertainty should therefore not be 
confused with those who have more active sceptical disbeliefs. Indeed, research by 
Whitmarsh (in press) suggests that whereas an outright rejection of the notion of 
anthropogenic climate change is not widespread, the proportion of the public who 
express some degree of uncertainty about climate change is far higher. Attitudinal 
ambivalence is in the social psychology literature often defined as the degree to 
which an attitude object is evaluated positively and negatively at the same time 
(Thompson et al., 1995; Jonas et al., 2000), although in many cases it is used to 
describe any contradictory ‘evaluations’ someone holds on a particular issue (cf. 
Breckler, 1994). In other words, people who are ambivalent about climate change 
possess feelings, attitudes, or beliefs that are in tension with one another (Carolan, 
2010). It is, however, difficult to clearly distinguish between the different attitudinal 
terms in the way they are used by the general public to describe their own personal 
views, as well as in the way they are measured in attitudinal research. For example, 
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2006) have shown that measures of attitudinal ambivalence 
and uncertainty may be compounded into a single dimension. This suggests that 
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certain ‘direct’ ambivalence items (e.g. “I have mixed feelings about […]”) may be 
measuring the same underlying construct as measures of uncertainty 
All types of Rahmstorf’s climate scepticism, as well as uncertainty and 
ambivalence, can be found among the general public in the UK and beyond. 
Although straightforward trend scepticism does not appear to be too widespread, 
many express some level of uncertainty about whether climate change is really 
happening (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a; Whitmarsh, in press), experience some degree 
of ambivalence or mixed feelings (Poortinga et al., 2006), or feel they need more 
information to form a clear opinion about it (Whitmarsh, 2009). Also, there is some 
recent evidence that at least in the US the increase in trend scepticism has been 
levelling off and may indicate a return to higher levels of concern about the existence 
of climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2010b). 
Attribution scepticism appears to be more common among the British public 
than trend scepticism. However, while a clear majority in the UK still believes that 
climate change is at least partly caused by human activity (Whitmarsh et al., 2011), 
there has long been a substantial minority who have been sceptical about the 
existence of anthropogenic climate change (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Downing & 
Ballantyne, 2007). A recent Eurobarometer (2009) poll indicated that a majority 
(55%) of the European public disagreed that emissions of carbon dioxide have only a 
marginal impact on climate change; but also that a fairly substantial 30% agreed that 
it was the case. In the UK, the percentage who agreed with this statement was even 
higher at 44%. Within the US, about one in three believe that global warming is 
caused mostly by natural changes in the environment while only about half think it is 
mostly caused by human activity (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a;b). 
Finally, with regard to scepticism about the impacts of climate change, the low 
ranking of climate change as a concern reflects a widespread perception amongst 
the public that the issue is a spatially and temporally remote risk (Weber, 2010). 
Whilst the impacts of climate change are generally considered socially relevant, most 
individuals do not feel it poses a prominent personal threat (e.g. Bord et al., 2000; 
Lowe et al., 2006). One English survey conducted in 2003 found that less than half 
of the respondents thought that they will be personally affected by climate change 
(Whitmarsh, 2009). The recent Eurobarometer (2009) poll indicated that impact 
scepticism is higher in the UK than in most other countries, although not as high as 
in the US (Leiserowitz, 2005; Leiserowitz et al., 2010a;b). The poll found that in the 
 7 
UK 40% agree that “the seriousness of climate change has been exaggerated”, 
compared to 27% across Europe. In a representative poll in the US, more than half 
of the respondents thought that global warming will not, or will barely, harm 
themselves, their family, or their community (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a;b). Although 
many people express mixed feelings about climate change, there is little evidence for 
ambivalence about the impacts of climate change. Pidgeon et al. (2008) found a 
consistently negative set of responses, with very few people seeing it as holding 
benefits and most seeing it as posing risks for people in Britain.  
The extent attitudinal uncertainty and scepticism about the existence, 
anthropogenic nature, and impacts of climate change seems in part to stem from 
doubts about the scientific consensus on climate change. This doubt expressed by 
the general public may partly be a product of the media presentation of climate 
change as controversial and uncertain, and the human causes of climate change not 
being self-evident (e.g. Antilla 2005; Malka et al., 2009). A small but well-organised 
counter-movement that has produced the majority of the sceptical literature (Jacques 
et al., 2008) may have given the impression that that there is considerable 
disagreement among scientists, augmented by a journalistic norm for balance to 
present both sides of the argument even if there is widespread consensus among 
scientists that human activity is contributing to climate change (Boykoff & Boykoff, 
2004, Hargreaves et al., 2003). Indeed, a recent poll has shown that two out of five 
Americans believe that “there is a lot of disagreement among scientists about 
whether or not global warming is happening” (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a). In contrast 
to what many members of the public think, there is almost universal consensus in the 
scientific community about many aspects of climate change. Anderegg et al. (2010) 
showed that 97-98% of climate researchers support the tenets of anthropogenic 
climate change outlined by the IPCC, and that the relative expertise and scientific 
prominence of the researchers unconvinced of anthropogenic climate change are 
substantially below those of convinced researchers (also see Doran & Zimmerman, 
2009). Although there is legitimate uncertainty about the exact nature, scale and 
timing of the impacts of climate change, given the complexity of climate-human 
systems (Patt & Dessai, 2005; Pidgeon & Butler, 2009), most scientists believe that 
global temperatures will keep rising and are likely to cause harm to natural and 
human systems (Anderegg & Harold, 2009). The public also appear to be somewhat 
aware of the uncertainty about the impacts of climate change, with approximately 
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40% of the British public supporting the idea that the climate system is too complex 
and uncertain for scientists to make useful forecasts (Downing & Ballantyne, 2007). 
Although the typology of Rahmstorf (2004) is an intuitively appealing 
framework for describing different forms of scepticism, it is a perspective constructed 
by climate scientists to describe the arguments of members of an emerging counter-
movement that do not accept mainstream climate science consensus, and may 
therefore be less appropriate to describe public views on climate change. That is, the 
public may not necessarily distinguish between the different components of the 
climate debate. Indeed, recent qualitative work suggests that scepticism about the 
status of climate knowledge forms a coherent view among sections of the general 
public (Capstick & Pidgeon, under review). Doubts about the evidence base and 
methodology of climate science often relate to the veracity of scientific claims in 
general, the validity and importance of an anthropogenic component, as well as the 
severity of potential impacts. In quantitative work, Whitmarsh (in press) found that a 
wide range of scepticism and uncertainty items could be combined to form a reliable 
scepticism scale, suggesting that uncertainties about different aspects of the climate 
debate are closely interlinked. 
Only a limited number of studies have attempted to identify the socio-
demographic characteristics of people who express sceptical beliefs about climate 
change. A review of public attitudes to climate change suggested that older people 
are more likely to be sceptical (Upham et al., 2009). Yet, there is also evidence of 
substantial scepticism in younger age groups. In a study among 11-17 year olds, 
about one in ten rejected the notion of anthropogenic climate change (COI, 2008). 
Scepticism is also somewhat higher amongst men and car owners (Defra, 2002; 
2007; Whitmarsh, 2005). Furthermore, research has highlighted the interaction 
between personal values and scepticism. People with more pro-environmental 
values are less likely to be sceptical about the seriousness of climate change; and 
similarly conservative political values are strongly associated with scepticism 
(Dunlap & McCright, 2008a; Eurobarometer, 2009; Whitmarsh, 2009). Leiserowitz 
(2005) identified several distinct interpretive communities in the United States, 
including so-called ‘naysayers’ who express high levels of scepticism and perceive 
climate change as a very low or non-existent danger. Leiserowitz (2005) found that 
these climate ‘naysayers’ are predominantly white, male, Republican, politically 
conservative, holding pro-individualist, pro-hierarchist, and anti-egalitarian 
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worldviews, anti-environmental attitudes, distrustful of most institutions, and highly 
religious. Dunlap and McCright (2008a) have shown that over the last decade 
climate change beliefs have largely polarised along Democratic and Republican 
Party lines. Growing scepticism about the news coverage of global warming has 
gone hand-in-hand with Republicans’ declining belief that the world’s climate is 
changing. Within the UK, Whitmarsh (in press) found that older respondents without 
a formal education tended to be the most sceptical about climate change. However, 
the strongest associations were found with political affiliation and environmental 
values. Those with a conservative voting intention and low environmental values 
tended to be the most uncertain about the reality and severity of climate change.  
Although these studies have provided important information about the 
individuals who express doubt about climate change, a more detailed and systematic 
investigation of climate scepticism is needed. Previous studies have generally 
focused on just a single aspect of climate scepticism, without an explicit theoretical 
framework or specification of the type of climate scepticism that were considered. No 
studies have been conducted that have intentionally included indicators of trend, 
attribution, and impact scepticism at the same time. It is currently not clear how 
widespread the different types of scepticism are; whether and to what extent they are 
distinct in the public mind; how they are associated with related attitude aspects, 
such as uncertainty and ambivalence; and how they are distributed across the 
general British population. 
1.3. Aims of the Study 
In this study we undertake a detailed investigation of public scepticism about 
climate change in Britain, with a number of closely interrelated objectives. First, to 
explore how widespread climate sceptical beliefs are in Britain using the trend, 
attribution, and impact scepticism typology of Rahmstorf (2004). Second, to evaluate 
the robustness of the Rahmstorf (2004) typology to describe public scepticism about 
climate change. Here we examine whether the British public distinguish between the 
different types of scepticism. Previous research has suggested that the different 
types are closely interlinked in the public mind (e.g. Capstick & Pidgeon, under 
review), and may have common ideological roots (see Objective 4). Third, to explore 
in what way scepticism is associated with other related attitudinal constructs. Here it 
is examined how strongly climate sceptical views are held (in terms of attitude 
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certainty), and whether they evoke conflicting perceptions on climate change (cf. 
attitudinal ambivalence). The fourth and final objective of the study is to provide an 
in-depth profile of individuals who express sceptical views on climate change. In this 
study we will explore how climate sceptical views are associated with a range of 
socio-demographic, personal values, and voting intention variables in Britain, using a 
nationally representative sample. This is to show how climate sceptical beliefs are 
distributed across the British population and how strongly they are rooted in people’s 
core values and worldviews (cf. Leiserowitz, 2005; Whitmarsh, in press). 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Procedure and Respondents 
A nationally representative quota sample of the British population aged 15 
years and older (n=1,822) were interviewed face-to-face in their own homes by 
Ipsos-MORI between 5 January and 26th March, 2010. Computer Assisted Personal 
Interviews were conducted by fully trained and supervised interviewers and took 30 
minutes on average to complete. Interviews were conducted at 315 sample points, 
which were selected randomly from a stratified sample of output areas sorted by 
Government Office Region and council area. Interviewers approached selected 
addresses within the sample points until quotas were reached for gender, age, and 
working status. The findings from the overall British sample are based on a core 
sample of 1,528, to which additional booster samples from Scotland (109) and Wales 
(185) were added. The data were weighted to the profile of the known British 
population on the basis of gender, age, working status, social grade and ethnicity. 
Full details of the data collection can be found in the technical report of the study 
(XXXX et al. 2010). 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Climate Scepticism  
A range of items was included in the survey that could be used as indicators 
of Climate Scepticism. Two items were used to assess Trend Scepticism. People 
were asked “As far as you know, do you personally think the world’s climate is 
changing or not?”, with three answer options (“yes”, “no”, and “don’t know”); as well 
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as to what extent they agree with the statement “I am uncertain that climate change 
is really happening” on a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree”. The ‘don’t know’ responses were omitted from the analyses (6%). 
Attribution Scepticism was assessed by asking “Thinking about the causes of climate 
change, which, if any, of the following best describes your opinion”. The answer 
options were: “climate change is entirely caused by natural processes”, “climate 
change is mainly caused by natural processes”, “climate change is partly caused by 
natural processes and partly caused by human activity”, “climate change is mainly 
caused by human activity”, and “climate change is completely caused by human 
activity”. Agreement (again, on a 5-point scale) with the statement “Most scientists 
agree that humans are causing climate change” was also used as indicator for 
attribution scepticism. Impact Scepticism was assessed by asking people to what 
extent they agree with the statements “The seriousness of climate change is 
exaggerated” and “It is uncertain what the effects of climate change will be”. These 
items again used a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly agree” to strongly disagree”. 
2.2.2. Attitudinal Certainty, Ambivalence, and Affect 
Related attitude aspects were assessed as follows. An Attitude Certainty 
scale (Cronbach’s α=0.82) was constructed using the items “I have strong opinions 
about climate change” and “My emotions relating to climate change are quite strong”. 
Attitudinal Ambivalence was measured with a direct measure (“I have mixed feelings 
about climate change”) and assessed indirectly on the basis of the perceived risks 
and benefits of the impacts of climate change (“There are [risks/benefits] to people in 
Britain from climate change”). An indirect Ambivalence Index was calculated using 
the equation of Thompson et al. (1995). The resulting scale ranged from -1 to 5, with 
higher scores representing more conflicting risk and benefit perceptions. As previous 
research has shown that climate change has negative affective connotations for 
almost all (Leiserowitz, 2005), which may lead to cognitive-affective ambivalence 
among climate sceptical individuals (cf. Lavine et al., 1998), a general ‘Affect’ 
indicator was included (“On a purely emotional level, how do you personally feel 
about climate change”) with a 5-point response scale (from “very positive” to “very 
negative”). 
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2.2.3. Personal Values 
Personal values were measured using the short version of the Schwarz Value 
Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz (1992) proposed that the ten motivationally 
distinct ‘universal’ values of Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-
Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity and Security can be 
organised according to the two dimensions of Conservation versus Openness to 
Change and Self-Transcendence versus Self-enhancement. The reliability and 
validity of the short (10-item) version of the SVS has been demonstrated empirically 
by Lindemann and Verkasalo (2005). In addition to the ten value items, four further 
items from the SVS were included to measure environmental values. These or 
comparable ‘biospheric’ value items have been used extensively in previous 
research (e.g. Stern, 2000; Poortinga et al., 2004; Slimak & Dietz, 2006; De Groot & 
Steg, 2008). Five standardised value scales were created with reasonable 
reliabilities (Cronbach’s α): Self-enhancement (Power, Achievement, Hedonism) 
0.62, Self-transcendence (Universalism, Benevolence) 0.62, Openness to Change 
(Stimulation, Self-Direction) 0.67, Traditional Values (Tradition, Conformity, Security) 
0.75, and Environmental Values 0.91. 
2.2.4. Socio-Demographics 
The socio-demographic variables of gender, age, and social grade were 
included in the analyses. Forty-eight percent of the sample was male. Five dummy 
variables represented the six age categories of 17-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 
and 65 years and (15%, 14%, 18%, 17%, 14%, and 22%, respectively). In this study 
we used the NRS (National Readership Survey) social grades system of socio-
economic classification, based on the occupation of the head of the household. The 
categories included AB: upper middle class and middle class (26%). C1: lower 
middle class (31%), C2: skilled working class (21%), and DE, working class and 
those at the lowest level of subsistence (23%). Furthermore, voting intention was 
assessed by asking “How would you vote if there were a General Election 
tomorrow?”. Dummy variables were used to represent Conservative (19%), Labour 
(16%), Liberal Democrats (10%), Other (Green Party, UKIP, BNP, Scottish 
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Nationalists, Welsh Nationalists, Democratic Party, and Other; 8%)1, and non-voting 
intentions (12%). Undecided voters were used as the reference group (29%). 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 and 2 show how widespread the different forms of climate scepticism 
are among the British public (Objective 1). Table 1 shows that public belief in climate 
change has dropped significantly from 91% in 2005 to 78% in 2010, and that the 
group of individuals who express trend sceptical views, i.e. who do not believe that 
the world’s climate is changing, has grown from 4% in 2005 to 15% in 2010 
(χ2(2)=1.172.e2, p<0.001). Table 2 shows that just under one-third (28%) are 
uncertain that climate change is really happening. A clear majority disagree that they 
are uncertain about the existence of climate change (59%). In regards to attribution 
scepticism, people more commonly consider that climate change is caused by a 
combination of human activity and natural processes (47%) or feel it is caused 
mostly or entirely by human activity (31%), than consider has mostly or entirely 
natural causes (18%). Fifty-seven percent of respondents agree that most scientists 
agree that humans are causing climate change. A much smaller proportion (21%) 
disagrees with this statement. The sample is split as to whether the seriousness of 
climate change is exaggerated, with 40% agreeing and 42% disagreeing with the 
statement. Furthermore, respondents express high levels of uncertainty regarding 
the impacts of climate change. Fully 69% agree that they are uncertain what the 
effects of climate change will be, while only 15% disagree. Overall, impact 
scepticism appears far more common than both trend and attribution scepticism.  
When cross-tabulating the responses to the different climate scepticism 
questions with the main trend scepticism indicator (see Table 2), it becomes clear 
that the different types of climate scepticism are closely inter-linked (Objective 2). 
Respondents’ belief in climate change was strongly associated with the other 
indicator of trend scepticism (χ2(2)=2.703e2, p<0.001). A clear majority who believe 
in climate change disagree that they are uncertain that climate change is really 
happening, while a clear majority of those who do not believe in climate change 
                                            
1 The numbers of respondents indicating their voting intention for these parties were too small to 
create separate categories. 
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agree with the statement. Surprisingly, one out of five who think the world’s climate is 
changing still express some degree of uncertainty about whether it is ‘really 
happening’. A clear majority (84%) of respondents who believe in climate change 
think that it is at least partially caused by human activity; while most of those who do 
not believe in climate change think that it is at least partially attributable to natural 
processes (71%; χ2(2)=1.339e2, p<0.001). Trend scepticism also appears to be 
associated with perceived scientific consensus regarding the anthropogenic nature 
of climate change (χ2(2)=95.540, p<0.001), even if more than one out of three trend 
sceptics still think that most scientists agree that humans are causing climate 
change. Table 2 also shows strong associations between trend scepticism and 
impact scepticism (χ2(2)=2.188e2, p<0.001; χ2(2)=6.623, p<0.05), although just 
under one-third (31%) of those who believe in climate change still agree with the 
statement “The seriousness of climate change is exaggerated”. Similarly, Table 2 
shows that more than two-thirds of both climate believers and non-believers agree 
that they are uncertain what the effects of climate change will be. This suggests that 
that the milder form of impact scepticism is still fairly common even among those 
who think climate change is happening. 
The results presented in Table 3 confirm that the different types of climate 
scepticism are strongly inter-linked (Objective 2). Correlations between the different 
indicators of trend, attribution and impact scepticism are medium to large in size (cf. 
Cohen, 1988), although the correlations with ‘uncertainty about the future effects of 
climate change’ are somewhat smaller. Indeed, a scale analysis shows that an 
internally consistent scale can be created without the latter variable (Cronbach’s 
α=0.72).2 Overall, these results suggest that the general public does not clearly 
distinguish between the different types of climate scepticism, and that people who 
are sceptical about one aspect of climate change also tend to be sceptical about 
other aspects. The 4-item climate scepticism scale is used alongside the trend 
scepticism indicator reflecting belief in climate change to address the remaining 
objectives of the study. 
                                            
2 The trend scepticism indicator reflecting belief in climate change (“…do you personally think the 
world’s climate is changing or not?”) was not included in this scepticism scale analysis because it 
uses a different response scale (‘yes’, ‘no’, don’t know’). 
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The associations of the main trend scepticism indicator and the constructed 
climate scepticism scale with other climate-related attitude aspects (Objective 3) are 
presented in Table 4. The results show that sceptical individuals are less certain and 
more ambivalent about the climate change than non-sceptical individuals. Non-
sceptical individuals express higher levels of attitudinal certainty about climate 
change, while sceptical individuals express higher levels of attitudinal ambivalence 
on both the direct and indirect measure. Perhaps not surprisingly, sceptical individual 
perceive lower risks from climate change than non-sceptical individuals. Slightly 
conflicting results were found for perceived benefits: whereas it is significantly 
associated with the climate scepticism scale, its correlation with the trend scepticism 
indicator is non-significant. Neither sceptical nor non-sceptical groups appear to 
perceive major benefits associated with climate change. The weakest associations 
were found for ‘affect’. Climate change appears to elicit negative affective responses 
in both sceptical and non-sceptical groups, suggesting that this may be a source of 
psychological ambivalence for sceptical individuals. Table 5 shows that correlations 
with the scepticism scale are generally higher than the ones with the trend 
scepticism indicator. This is probably due to the lower variance within the binary 
trend scepticism variable; and shows that, where possible, multiple indicators should 
be used to reflect the nuance in the degree of climate scepticism.  
In order to address Objective 4, to provide a profile of individuals who express 
sceptical views on climate change, two analyses were conducted regressing the 
trend scepticism indicator and the constructed climate scepticism scale on the 
personal values, socio-demographics and voting intention variables. The first column 
of Table 5 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis using the main trend 
scepticism indicator as the outcome variable. This shows individuals with 
environmental and self-transcendence values are more likely to believe the world’s 
climate is changing. Older respondents, in particular those aged 55 and over; social 
grade DE; and individuals with a conservative or non-voting intention, were 
significantly more likely to think that the climate is not changing. The second column 
in Table 5 shows the results of a linear regression analysis with the standardised 
climate scepticism scale as the outcome variable. Individuals with traditional values 
expressed higher levels of climate scepticism, while those with environmental and 
self-transcendence values expressed lower levels of climate scepticism. 
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Respondents aged 55 and over; of social grade C1, C2 and DE; and a conservative 
voting intention expressed higher levels of climate scepticism.  
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper we have carried out a comprehensive investigation of public 
scepticism about anthropogenic climate change in Britain using the framework of 
Rahmstorf (2004). The study explored how widespread trend, attribution and impact 
sceptical views are among the British public, to what extent they are interlinked, and 
in what way they are associated with related attitude aspects, such as uncertainty 
and ambivalence. It further provided a socio-demographic and ‘ideological’ profile of 
individuals who express climate sceptical views. 
This study suggests that climate scepticism is currently not widespread in 
Britain. Although belief in the existence of climate change has decreased 
substantially since a similar survey was conducted in 2005, still a great majority 
thinks that the world’s climate is changing. Similarly, relatively few people consider 
climate change to be mostly or entirely caused by natural processes, or perceive 
scientific uncertainty about the anthropogenic nature of climate change. However, 
the sample is split with regard to whether the seriousness of climate change has 
been exaggerated, suggesting that impact scepticism is more common than both 
trend and attribution scepticism. Despite the absence of widespread trend and 
attribution scepticism, there still is considerable uncertainty among the British public 
about the existence and exact impacts of climate change. A sizeable minority 
expressed uncertainty about whether climate change is really happening; and even 
among those who think that the world’s climate is changing, a majority agrees that 
they are uncertain what the effects of climate change will be. This is to some extent 
understandable given the inherent uncertainty in predicting future effects; climate 
change is perceptually a distant issue, and can only be indirectly judged by the 
general public through seasonal events and weather (e.g., Weber, 2010). The 
intangible and abstract nature of climate change may make it difficult for lay publics 
to engage with the topic and not feel some degree of uncertainty about it (e.g., 
Kollmuss & Aygeman, 2002; Weber, 2010). Furthermore, there is legitimate 
uncertainty about the exact impacts of climate change, as our understanding of how 
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climate systems work and interact with human and biological systems is far from 
complete (Patt & Dessai, 2005).  
As to whether the scepticism model of Rahmstorf (2004) can be used to 
describe public scepticism about climate change, this study shows that the different 
forms of climate scepticism are strongly inter-linked. Individuals who are sceptical 
about one aspect of climate change also tend to be more sceptical about other 
aspects of climate change, suggesting that the general public does not clearly 
distinguish between the different types of scepticism. This may mean that uncertainty 
about one aspect of climate change easily permeates to other areas –a process 
termed ‘uncertainty transfer’ by Spence et al. (under review). However, these 
findings should be nuanced by looking at the distribution of people’s views on climate 
change. Although there are clear associations between the different types of climate 
scepticism, the study has also shown that the milder form of impact scepticism is far 
more prevalent than the more extreme trend or attribution scepticism. Even among 
non-sceptical groups there is still considerable uncertainty about the impacts of 
climate change. Such uncertainty can hardly be described as an entrenched climate 
sceptical view. Also, there are a number of trend sceptics who perceive scientific 
consensus about the anthropogenic nature of climate change, raising the question of 
what evidence they base their scepticism on. So there appears to be a clear 
gradation according to the Rahmstorf typology, ranging from a more extreme but 
relatively rare denial of the existence of climate change to a milder but more 
common uncertainty about the impacts of climate change. This shows that it is 
important to use trend, attribution and impact scepticism measures in conjunction to 
reflect different degrees of climate scepticism. 
Attitudinal certainty appears mainly concentrated in non-sceptical groups. 
Whereas non-sceptical individuals felt more strongly about climate change, sceptical 
individuals express more mixed feelings and conflicting risk and benefit perceptions. 
Furthermore, climate change evokes negative affective responses, even among 
those who expressed high levels of climate scepticism. Here attitudinal ambivalence 
may results from conflicting cognitive and affective attitude components (Thompson 
et al., 1995; Lavine et al., 1998). The finding that climate scepticism is associated 
with attitudinal uncertainty, ambivalence, and conflicting cognitive-affective 
responses confirms that most climate sceptics may not hold their views very 
strongly. So, perhaps in contrast to the caricature of a dogmatic sceptic who is 
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“waiting to pounce on any scientific uncertainty”, climate sceptical publics seem to be 
less opinionated than non-sceptical publics. Nevertheless, uncertainty about climate 
change and its potential impacts may still be a major barrier to engagement, as the 
certain immediate costs of climate change mitigation have to compete with the 
discounted uncertain future costs of climate adaptation (Weber, 2010). Also, 
addressing existing uncertainties about different aspects of the climate change 
debate may be difficult to achieve through conventional risk communication. There is 
some evidence that, analogously to the asymmetry in trust (see e.g. Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2005), there is an ‘asymmetry in uncertainty’, in that it may be easier to 
instil uncertainty than to communicate certainty, in particular considering the inherent 
tentativeness of scientific knowledge. According to Michaels and Monforton (2005), a 
major tactic of opponents of public health and environmental regulations is to 
“manufacture uncertainty” by questioning the validity of scientific evidence (also see 
Jacques et al., 2008; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Once trust in some of its tenets has 
been undermined, it may be difficult to regain confidence in climate science again. 
The durability of distrust amongst sceptical groups is particularly likely given the 
strong value basis underpinning scepticism (discussed below). 
 With regard to the socio-demographic profile of climate sceptic publics, the 
results of this study are surprisingly similar to those of Whitmarsh (in press). Older 
respondents from lower socio-economic backgrounds and with conservative voting 
intentions were the most likely to express climate scepticism. Also, people who were 
politically disengaged (as indicated by a non-voting intention) were generally less 
likely to believe in the existence of climate change. Previous research conducted in 
the US and UK suggests that scepticism is most common among men (e.g. 
Leiserowitz, 2005; Upham et al., 2009). The so-called ‘white-male effect’ has been 
widely observed across different environmental and technological hazards (e.g. 
Flynn et al., 2004; Finucane et al., 2000), suggesting risk perception may be related 
to individuals’ level of decision power or interest in a particular hazard (Satterfield et 
al., 2004). In other words, those who feel more vulnerable and have less control over 
an issue tend to express more concern (Bord & O’Connor, 1997). However, this was 
not confirmed in the current study. In fact, more ‘vulnerable’ older respondents from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds were less likely to believe in possible impacts of 
anthropogenic climate change. Although the age effects could be explained by 
possible differences in time horizons in relation to climate change, it is not clear why 
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people from a lower socio-economic background are more sceptical about the 
existence and anthropogenic nature of climate change. A possible explanation is that 
concerns about climate change and the environment are overshadowed by more 
immediate financial concerns in the current economic climate (Weber, 2010). In 
particular people from lower socio-economic backgrounds may feel that they have 
been hit disproportionately by the late 2008 global economic crisis and subsequent 
rises in unemployment, with financial insecurities overshadowing concerns about 
environmental issues. Previous research has shown environmental concerns 
increase with social class (Bibbings, 2004; Norton & Leaman, 2004), which supports 
the idea that once basic material needs have been met ‘post-materialistic’ values 
become more important, i.e., that people are more likely to value the protection of 
the environment (Inglehart, 1990). 
The study further confirms that climate scepticism is rooted in people’s core 
values and worldviews, mirroring the findings of Whitmarsh (in press) that political 
affiliation and environmental values are the strongest correlates of uncertainty about 
climate change. Using a wider range of personal values from Schwartz’ value 
framework and a nationally representative sample, this study found that self-
transcendence, traditional, and environmental values are significantly associated 
with public views regarding anthropogenic climate change. Climate scepticism was 
found to be particularly common among individuals who are politically conservative 
and hold traditional values; while less common among individuals who hold self-
transcendence and environmental values. Despite using a different value framework, 
the results are largely in line with Leiserowitz (2005) who showed those with a 
conservative hierarchical value orientation have less favourable attitudes to climate 
change. The apparent political ideological basis of climate-related attitudes may 
explain why the different forms of scepticism are closely interlinked. The existence of 
fundamentally different groups – or interpretative communities (cf. Leiserowitz, 2005) 
– with significantly different outlooks on climate change, implies it is difficult to 
engage sceptical publics.	  Simply providing climate change information is unlikely to 
be successful, as new information is often interpreted in line with people their 
existing attitudes and worldviews (e.g. Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004), in particular 
where they are based on political ideology and personal values rather than on a 
critical evaluation of the available evidence (cf. Corner, 2009). Then again, the 
finding that most sceptics do not hold their views very strongly may offer some hope 
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for constructive communication and engagement. Indeed, qualitative work on public 
understandings of climate change has shown that just because individuals indicate 
that they do not personally worry about the impacts of climate change does not 
necessarily mean they think that there is nothing to worry about (Carolan, 2010). The 
general public may have various psychological reasons for not engaging with climate 
change, including a general distrust in environmental science, expertise and 
communication (Burgess et al., 1998; Wynne, 2002), an unwillingness to change 
their behaviour (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001), or despondency brought about by 
feelings of helplessness and lack of control (Lorenzoni et al., 2007); while others are 
simply disinterested or bored by the topic (Kerr, 2009). It is therefore important to 
tailor risk communications to different audiences and take into account the reasons 
of different publics for expressing doubt or disengagement from climate change, as 
they are likely to require very different approaches for re-engagement or behavioural 
change. 
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Table 1. Responses to the question” As far as you know, do you personally think the 
world’s climate is changing or not?” in 2005 and 2010 (%) 
 2005 a 
(n=1,491) 
2010 
(n=1,822) 
Yes 91 78 
No 4 15 
Don’t Know 5 6 
Note (a) Source: 2005 UEA/MORI Energy Survey (see Poortinga et al., 2006). 
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Table 2. Cross tabulations of trend, attribution, and impact scepticism indicators (%)  
 
Note: figures in the table may not add up to 100% due to missing values and 
rounding 
 
  Trend Scepticism  
  Do you personally think 
the world’s climate is 
changing or not?  
  
  Yes 
(n=1,427) 
No 
(n=279) 
Overall 
(n=1,822) 
Trend Scepticism     
I am uncertain that climate 
change is really happening 
Tend to/strongly agree 20 63 28 
Neither agree/disagree 9 16 12 
Tend to/strongly disagree 70 19 59 
     
Attribution Scepticism     
Causes of climate change Mainly/entirely caused by 
natural processes 
14 37 18 
partly caused by natural 
processes and partly 
caused by human activity 
48 34 46 
Mainly/entirely caused by 
human activity processes 
36 10 31 
     
Most scientists agree that 
humans are causing climate 
change 
Tend to/strongly agree 63 34 57 
Neither agree/disagree 16 18 17 
Tend to/strongly disagree 17 40 21 
     
Impact Scepticism     
The seriousness of climate 
change is exaggerated 
Tend to/strongly agree 31 76 40 
Neither agree/disagree 15 11 15 
Tend to/strongly disagree 52 10 42 
     
It is uncertain what the 
effects of climate change will 
be 
Tend to/strongly agree 69 71 69 
Neither agree/disagree 12 11 12 
Tend to/strongly disagree 18 11 15 
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Table 3. Correlations between trend, attribution and impact scepticism indicators 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Trend Scepticism       
1 Do you personally think the world’s 
climate is changing or not?  
1.00      
2 I am uncertain that climate change is 
really happening 
0.39*** 1.00     
        
Attribution Scepticism       
3 Causes of climate change 0.26*** 0.29*** 1.00    
4 Most scientists agree that humans are 
causing climate change 
0.24*** 0.28*** 0.48*** 1.00   
        
Impact Scepticism       
5 The seriousness of climate change is 
exaggerated 
0.39*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.38*** 1.00  
6 It is uncertain what the effects of 
climate change will be 
0.07* 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.19*** 1.00 
Note * p<0.05, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 4. Associations between climate scepticism and related attitude aspects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, n.s.=non-significant. 
 Trend Scepticism Climate Scepticism 
Attitude Certainty  -0.18*** -0.38*** 
Attitudinal Ambivalence 0.06* 0.31*** 
Ambivalence Index 0.08** 0.29** 
 -Perceived Risks -0.39*** -0.53*** 
 -Perceived Benefits 0.04n.s. 0.26*** 
Affect  0.03n.s. 0.17*** 
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Table 5. Logistic regression (“Trend Scepticism”) and linear regression (“Climate 
Scepticism” scale) analysis of climate scepticism  
 Trend Scepticism a 
Do you personally think 
the world’s climate is 
changing or not 
Climate Scepticism b 
 (no versus yes)  
 OR 95%CI p B SE p 
Personal Values       
Self-Enhancement 1.15 0.97-1.36 n.s. 0.03 0.03 n.s. 
Openness to Change 1.20 0.99-1.45 n.s. 0.05 0.03 n.s. 
Self-Transcendence 0.78 0.64-0.94 ** -0.10 0.03 ** 
Traditional Values 1.14 0.95-1.36 n.s. 0.13 0.03 *** 
Environmental Values 0.69 0.58-0.82 *** -0.26 0.03 *** 
       
Gender (female)       
Male 1.19 0.89-1.61 n.s. -0.02 0.05 n.s. 
       
Age (17-24)       
25-34 0.93 0.50-1.73 n.s. -0.07 0.09 n.s. 
35-44 1.94 1.11-3.38 * 0.03 0.09 n.s. 
45-54 1.54 0.86-2.78 n.s. 0.13 0.09 n.s. 
55-64 2.79 1.56-4.99 *** 0.24 0.10 * 
65 and over 2.66 1.51-4.67 *** 0.33 0.09 *** 
       
Social Grade (AB)       
C1 0.97 0.65-1.46 n.s. 0.15 0.07 * 
C2 1.50 0.98-2.30 n.s. 0.18 0.07 * 
DE 1.56 1.01-2.41 * 0.18 0.08 * 
       
Voting Intention (undecided)       
Conservative 1.94 1.28-2.94 ** 0.19 0.07 ** 
Labour 1.37 0.88-2.13 n.s. -0.13 0.07 n.s. 
Liberal Democrats 1.19 0.65-2.17 n.s. -0.06 0.09 n.s. 
Other 1.26 0.70-2.27 n.s. 0.01 0.10 n.s. 
Would not Vote 1.98 1.22-3.21 ** -0.00 0.09 n.s. 
Note * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, n.s.=non-significant; (a) odds ratios (OR) and 
95% confidence intervals (95%CI); (b) unstandardised regression coefficients (B) 
and standard errors (SE). 
